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Abstract
This study demonstrates that the U.S. equity premium has declined signiﬁcantly
during the last three decades. The study calculates the equity premium using a
variation of a formula in the classic Gordon stock valuation model. The
calculation includes the bond yield, the stock dividend yield, and the expected
dividend growth rate, which in this formulation can change over time. The
study calculates the premium for several measures of the aggregate U.S. stock
portfolio and several assumptions about bond yields and stock dividends and
gets basically the same result. The premium averaged about 7 percentage points
during 1926–70 and only about 0.7 of a percentage point after that. This result
is shown to be reasonable by demonstrating the roughly equal returns that
investments in stocks and consol bonds of the same duration would have earned
between 1982 and 1999, years when the equity premium is estimated to have
been zero.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Historically, investors holding corporate equities have
earned a premium, or an extra return for holding equities
instead of bonds, which have more predictable returns. Es-
timates of this equity premium in the United States av-
erage around 4 percentage points for the past two centu-
ries (Siegel 1998) and around 7 percentage points for the
1926–99 period (Center for Research in Security Prices).
The historical size of the U.S. equity premium has puz-
zled economists since the mid-1980s. Economists had as-
sumed that the size of this premium is primarily a measure
of the compensation that investors demand for taking on
the extra risk inherent in equity investments. But the stan-
dard asset pricing model which incorporates this assump-
tion has not been able to account for an equity premium as
large as 4 percentage points; with reasonable levels of risk
aversion and other standard assumptions, the model pre-
dicts instead a premium around 0.25 of a percentage point
(MehraandPrescott1985,HansenandJagannathan1991).
This discrepancy between data and theory has come to be
known as the equity premium puzzle.
The puzzle has led to some fruitful work. (See the 1996
literature review by Kocherlakota.) The surprising histori-
calsizeoftheequitypremiumsuggeststhatsomethingelse
besides inherent risk is determining its size, something re-
lated,perhaps,whichthestandardmodelissimplynotcap-
turing. One view in the ﬁnance literature is that this some-
thing is market imperfections—things like the inability of
investors to fully insure against major risks outside the or-
ganized stock markets, such as shocks to their labor in-
come;thesigniﬁcantdirectandindirectcoststhatinvestors
face in order to make transactions; and incomplete knowl-
edgeamonginvestorsaboutexistinginvestmentopportuni-
ties.
1 These imperfections are thought to decrease the will-
ingness of investors to bear risks and so increase the return
they require for investing in risky assets, including stocks.
This view about the reason for the large historical eq-
uity premium is consistent with recent U.S. experience. If
the view is right, and the historical premium is primarily
due to market imperfections, then the premium can rea-
sonably be expected to shrink when such imperfections
are reduced. That seems to be what has happened in the
UnitedStatesoverthelastthreedecades.Dramatictechno-
logical improvements clearly have been made since 1970,




1997, Claus and Thomas 1999, Siegel 1999, Wadhwani
1999, and Fama and French 2001).
Here we demonstrate that decrease in the equity premi-
um, using the classic Gordon (1962) stock valuation mod-
el. This model gives a formula for calculating the equity
premium as a function of the bond yield, the stock divi-
dend yield, and the expected growth rate in dividends. The
Gordon model assumes that the expected growth rate in
dividends is a constant. We show that the model can be
readily modiﬁed to accommodate a different assumption,
that the expected dividend growth rate changes over time.
We use the Gordon formula to calculate the equity premi-
um for several alternative measures of the aggregate U.S.
stock portfolio and several alternative assumptions about
stock dividends and bond yields, and we get basically the
same result: the equity premium has come down signiﬁ-
cantly in the last three decades. In fact, some of our exer-
cises suggest that the premium is now about where the
standard model says it should be.
Note that in calculating the estimate of the equity pre-
mium, we do not follow the common practice of simply
calculating the historical average difference between re-
turns on stocks and returns on bonds. During a period
when the equity premium is declining, that simple calcula-
tion with historical averages may not result in a good es-
timate of the premium that investors actually expect to
earn in the future. This is because the calculation misses
the changes in prices that would accompany an unexpect-
ed decline in the equity premium. Our more complicated
method of calculating the premium with a dynamic ver-
sion of the Gordon model is an attempt to capture all
those changes.
Our result, that the U.S. equity premium has declined
over the last three decades, conﬁrms the results of other
economists. However, we do not provide a deﬁnitive ex-
planationfortherecentpremiumdecline.Muchmorework
must be done to determine its cause and to build a full the-
ory of asset pricing. Our work does, however, lead to a
deﬁnite warning for inexperienced investors. If the recent
decrease in the equity premium is due to the recent techno-
logical improvements—if some major market imperfec-
tions have been virtually eliminated—then the premium
can be expected to stay at its current small size for the
foreseeable future. Investors who rely on history to predict
the returns they can expect from the stock market, there-
fore, are likely to be disappointed.
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Formula
Here we derive a formula that we can use to calculate esti-
mates for the size of the equity premium at any particular
point in time. To derive the formula, we rely on the basic
present value relation discussed in introductory ﬁnance
textbooks: the stock price equals the discounted present
value of expected future dividends.
We measure the equity premium at a given point in
time as the difference between the stock yield and the
long-term bond yield.
3 The bond yield is the discount rate
at which the price of the bond equals the discounted pres-
ent value of the stream of future coupon payments and the
terminal principal payment. We deﬁne the stock yield in
an analogous way: It is the discount rate at which the
market value of stocks in the equity portfolio equals the
discounted present value of the stream of expected future
dividends from those stocks. Therefore, the stock yield
can be thought of as the rate of return investors expect to
earn over the long run from their investment in equities.













t is the stock yield and r
b
t is the bond yield. By def-
inition, the yield rt of an asset with price pt and dividend
stream {dt}
∞





The actual return on the asset is[(pt+1+dt+1)/pt]− 1, which
is more volatile than the yield. But, over long horizons, theyield and the return should have similar means. Therefore,
average yields are often used to forecast average returns.
If we linearize equation (2) and solve for the yield, then
we have
(3) rt ≈ Et(dt+1/pt) + ω 1Etgt+2
+ ω 2Etgt+3 +...+ω τ Etgt+τ +1 +...
where ω τ = (1+g)
τ −1(r−g)/(1+r)
τ is the weight given to the
expected dividend growth rate in period t + τ +1 ,gt =
(dt/dt−1) − 1 is the growth rate of dividends, g is the mean
of the dividend growth rates, and ris the mean stock yield.
(It can be veriﬁed that the weights ω τ for τ = 1, 2, ..., ∞
sum to 1.) According to equation (3), the stock yield is the
sum of the dividend yield and a weighted average of the
expected future growth rates in stock dividends. This is the
dynamic version of the Gordon (1962) valuation model,
which assumes that the expected dividend growth rate is
constant.
Our formula is similar to one derived by Campbell and
Shiller (1988). However, Campbell and Shiller log-linear-
ize the budget constraint for stock returns, while we lin-
earize the present value relation in equation (2). If at time
t the expected growth rate of future dividends is constant,
then our formula for the yield simpliﬁes to the Gordon val-
uation model’s:
(4) rt = Et(dt+1/pt) + g
where g is the constant dividend growth rate. This equa-
tion will hold even when the expected dividend growth
rate is not constant, but then g will be an equivalent con-
stant growth rate that is some weighted average of expect-
ed future growth rates.
We use equation (4) to construct our baseline estimates
of stock yields. Basically, our estimate for the equity pre-
mium is the stock yield thus computed minus the yield on
long-term government bonds.
Data
To estimate the equity premium for U.S. stocks at various
pointsintime,weuseseveraldifferentstockportfoliosand




We use two portfolios of publicly traded stocks and one
measure intended to cover all stocks owned in the United
States.
The most commonly used benchmark portfolio in the
ﬁnancial press is the Standard & Poor’s composite index
(S&P stocks). Before 1957, this index covered 90 com-
panies; since March 1957, it has covered 500. The stocks
included in the S&P index are those with the largest stock
market value. With the addition of new companies in
1957, the market value of S&P stocks more than doubled.
(See Chart 1.) At the end of 1999, the market value of
these stocks was roughly 1.2 times the value of the U.S.
gross national product (GNP).
The market value of S&P stocks is now about 75 per-
cent of the value of all stocks traded in the major U.S.
stock exchanges. To get a broader view, therefore, we also
consider a broader stock market index: the value-weighted
portfolio of publicly traded stocks in an index constructed
by the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP stocks). Between 1926 and 1961,
these include the stocks traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change(NYSE);between1962and1972,thestockstraded
there and on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX); and
since 1973, the stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and
the Nasdaq Stock Market. The number of stocks traded on
these exchanges has grown from roughly 500 in 1926 to
over 8,000 in 1999. (The market value of CRSP stocks
over this period is also displayed in Chart 1.)
Still, many corporations issue stocks that are not pub-
licly traded, so we broaden our view further to attempt to
include them. We consider as well data on all stocks held
by U.S. residents, data which are collected and published
by the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (BOG
stocks). These data are available only back to 1946. (Chart
1 displays the market value of these stocks too.)
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Notice in Chart 1 that in 1946 the market value of BOG
stocks is roughly twice the value of CRSP stocks (which,
again, in 1946 included only stocks traded on the NYSE).
In 1999, that gap is nearly closed, with the value of BOG
stocks at 1.9 times GNP as opposed to 1.6 times GNP for
CRSP stocks. Some publicly traded stocks are held by
foreigners, so the value of stocks held by U.S. residents
(BOG stocks) should not necessarily exceed the value of
the stocks traded on the major stock exchanges (CRSP
stocks). In fact, according to these data, in 1981 the value
of publicly traded stocks seems to have been slightly high-
er than the value of all stocks held by U.S. residents.
In Chart 2, we plot the dividend yields for all three
stock portfolios. Recall that our formula for stock yields is
the dividend yield for the stock portfolio plus a measure of
the expected growth rate in dividends. To calculate stock
yields, we use the arithmetic average growth rate in div-
idends during 1927–99 as the expected growth rate in div-
idends for the two publicly traded stock portfolios. For the
third stock portfolio—all stocks held by U.S. residents as
reported by the Fed—we construct a dividend yield by di-
viding the total dividends reported in the U.S. national in-
come and product account (NIPA) data, which are avail-
able back to 1929 (U.S. Commerce, various dates), by the
beginning-of-yeartotalstockvalue,whichisavailableback
to 1946 (FR Board, various dates).
AcomparisonofCharts1and2showsclearlythatmost
ofthemovementsindividendyieldsareduetomovements
in prices. During the 1960s and the 1990s, when stock
prices are relatively high, dividend yields are relatively
low. Before the 1980s, the three dividend yield series are
very close. Thereafter, however, the yield for BOG stocks
is higher than those for the standard stock indexes because
total NIPA dividends have grown faster than GNP.
6 This
growth is not enough though to offset the rise in prices, so
we doin factsee asigniﬁcant declinein the dividendyield.
In Table 1, we compare the growth of nominal divi-
dends for our three portfolios to the growth of nominal
output and the price level in the United States during
1927–99. The output measure is nominal GNP, and the
price level measure is the consumer price index (CPI).
Note that over the 1927–99 period, the average annual
growth rates for the S&P and CRSP stock portfolios are
similar. The average growth rates of both portfolios have
been lower than that of nominal GNP over the sampleperiod. The main growth differences between these port-
folios occur in the World War II years and the high in-
ﬂation years of the 1970s. In those periods, dividends of
smaller companies grew more than those of larger compa-
nies.
In contrast, the average dividend growth for the portfo-
lio of BOG stocks is comparable to the growth rate in
nominal GNP. However, the periods of high growth for
GNP do not coincide with the periods of high growth for
BOG dividends. World War II is a time of fast growth in
GNP while recent decades have been a time of fast growth
in dividends. Between 1985 and 1999, total BOG stock
dividends rose from 0.023 of GNP to 0.040 of GNP.
Bonds
For bonds, we use data on nominal yields of U.S. Treasury
securitiesreportedbyIbbotsonAssociates(2000).InChart
3, we plot yields for bonds of two maturities. Over the
1926–99period,theaverageyieldonintermediate-term(5-
year) bonds was 4.8 percent while the average yield on
long-term (20-year) bonds was 5.3 percent. The difference
in these yields is most prominent during the Great Depres-
sion and World War II. In other periods, the term structure
of interest ratesis quite ﬂat, andthe yields onintermediate-
and long-term bonds are close.
In our equity premium estimates, we concentrate on the
long-term bond yields. Table 2 lists their average values
during 1926–99 as a whole and over various subperiods.
Chart3showsclearlythatlong-termbondyieldspeakedin
1981 and have come down signiﬁcantly since then.
Estimates
Now we use our formula and the data just described to
calculate estimates of the U.S. equity premium over our
sample period.
The formula requires that, before computing the equity
premium, wecompute the stockyield—the sumof the div-
idendyieldandtheaveragegrowthrateofdividends.Chart
4 displays the results of that computation for our three
stock portfolios for each year during 1926–99, along with
the yield on the long-term government bond portfolio. The
difference between the stock and bond yields is our esti-
mate of the equity premium.
Table 2 lists the average stock yields for the entire
1926–99 period as well as for the various subperiods.
These calculations assume, remember, that the dividend
growth rates are constant, the same as their average his-
torical growth rates during the 1926–99 period.
From Chart 4 and Table 2, we can see that average
stock yields during the 1960s and the 1990s are about the
same.However,theequitypremiummustbemuchsmaller
during the 1990s because the bond yields are higher then.
Chart 5 and Table 3 display our estimates of the equity
premium itself. For two of our stock portfolios (the S&P
andCRSP stocks), the equitypremium is actually negative
during the 1980s and close to zero during the 1990s.
Recall that under the assumption of perfect capital mar-
kets, economic theory justiﬁes only a small equity premi-
um (in the range of from 0 to 0.25 of a percentage point).
As can be seen from Chart 5 and Table 3, our estimated
premium is much larger than that for most of the 1926–99
sampleperiod.Recently,however,thepremiumhasshrunk
to a size closer to that which theory predicts.
Between 1926 and 1970, for example, the average pre-
miumfortheS&Pstocksrelativetolong-termgovernment
bonds is 6.8 percentage points. Since then, this premium
has averaged 0.7 of a percentage point. In 1999, the divi-
dend yield is 1.36 percent, and the bond yield is 6.82 per-
cent. If we add the average S&P dividend growth rate to






9 =(1.36 percent + 5.19 percent) − 6.82 percent
= −0.27 of a percentage point
or an equity premium that is slightly negative.
If we use the CRSP portfolio, then the equity premium
is close to zero (−0.05 of a percentage point) in 1999.
For the total stocks held by U.S. residents, as measured
by our BOG stock portfolio, the decrease in the equity
premium has been less dramatic because of the recent
growth in dividends. Between 1946 and 1970, these stock
yields are 7.5 percentage points higher than bond yields on
average. After 1970, this difference shrinks to 3.1 percent-






9 =(2.60 percent + 6.93 percent) − 6.82 percent
= 2.71 percentage points.
Robustness
The assumption that dividends are expected to grow at a
constant rate through time may be too restrictive; after all,
dividend growth rates have varied considerably across de-
cades(Table1).Therefore,wenextconsideralternativeas-
sumptions on the dividend process. We also consider the
sensitivity of our results to different measures of dividends
and bonds of different maturities. We try here to determine
whether the apparent decline in the equity premium is due
to mistaken assumptions behind our calculations. It does
not appear to be; these exercises do not change our result.
Is Our Dividend Growth Too Low?
We start by adjusting the dividend growth to take account
of what may be higher productivity growth in the real U.S.
economy. Some think that recent improvements in infor-
mation technology have led to sustainable higher produc-
tivity growth. (See, for example, Jovanovic and Rousseau
2000.) This “new economy” view assumes that the 1990s
aremuchlikethepost–IndustrialRevolutionperiod,which
enjoyed the fruits of tremendous technological advances.
Higherproductivitytranslatesintohighergrowthinoutput,
earnings, and dividends, which our original estimates of
constant dividend growth did not capture.
But we don’t think such growth bursts are permanent.
Ultimately,realgrowthincreasesaredeterminedbygrowth
in factors of production like labor and output per worker.
And recent growth in these elements has not been impres-
sive. In the 1990s, annual growth in the U.S. labor force
has been roughly 1 percent—lower than in earlier years,
when more women and baby boomers were entering the
workforce. Similarly, productivity has grown only about 1
percent per year (Krugman 1997).
Still, suppose that the U.S. economy experienced not a
permanent, but a temporary increase in growth, with the
rate eventually returning to the postwar trend. Recall thatwe saw on Table 1 that the growth rate of dividends for
BOG stocks—all corporate equities held by U.S. resi-
dents—has recently accelerated along with GNP. Other
evidence for a temporary increase is the recent consensus
forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System
(IBES); they predict above-average earnings growth over
the next ﬁve years. With earnings projected to be higher,
dividends should be too.
Suppose that we assume that the growth in dividends
will continue to be high for, say, the next ﬁve years and
then will revert back to its long-run rate. Between 1980
and 1999, the BOG stock (NIPA) dividends grew roughly
3 percentage points per year faster than their historical an-
nual average of 6.9 percent. If we expect dividend growth
to run at 9.9 percent for ﬁve years and then revert to the
long-run rate of 6.9 percent, the formula for the price of









































s = 9.86 percent. If r
b = 6.82 percent, then the
equity premium is 3.04 percentage points. This is a bit
larger than our baseline 1999 estimate of 2.71 percentage
points, but it is still much smaller than the 1946–70 av-
erage of 7.5 percentage points.
As another example, consider our calculations for the
S&P stocks. Earlier, we used a dividend growth rate for
these stocks of 5.19 percent, which is the average growth
rate in their dividends during 1927–99 (Table 1). This
growth rate is signiﬁcantly lower than that of GNP, which
grew 6.72 percent on average over the same period. Sup-
pose that we forecast future growth in S&P stock divi-
dends to be more in line with average GNP growth. This
would increase our estimate of the S&P-based equity pre-
mium from −0.27 of a percentage point to 1.26 percentage
points.(SeeTable4.)Butagain,evenadjustedforpotential
temporary increases in dividend growth, the estimated eq-
uity premium is much smaller than the historical average.
Is Our Dividend Yield Too Low?
Nowweseeifusingdifferentmeasuresofdividendsinour
formula makes a difference to our estimates of the equity
premium. In our earlier computations, we considered cash
dividends only. During the 1980s, however, corporations
increased the amount of their share repurchases, possibly
as a way of providing a tax advantage for shareholders.
Since share repurchases form a part of the total distribu-
tions to shareholders, some think they should not be ig-
nored when measuring dividends.
Theoretically, adding share repurchases to cash divi-
dends should not change our calculated equity premium.
When a broader measure of dividends—cash dividends
plus share repurchases—is used in equation (4), g should
be the growth rate in that broad measure. When a narrow
measure of dividends—just cash—is used, then g should
be the growth rate in that narrow measure. If share repur-
chases are simply substitutes for cash dividends, then the
level of the stock yield, and thus the size of the equity pre-
mium, should be the same for both measures.
To see this, consider a simple example of Wadhwani
(1999).
As a ﬁrst scenario, suppose that a ﬁrm makes a steady
annual proﬁt of $1,000 and pays the entire proﬁt as div-
idends.Supposealsothatthenumberofsharesoutstanding
is 1,000 (which implies dividends per share equal to $1).
If the discount rate r
s on equity is 10 percent, then the
price of the stock is $10 [ps,0 = d1/(r
s−g) = 1/0.1].
Now consider a second scenario which involves repur-
chasing shares. Suppose that the ﬁrm instead pays half of
its$1,000 proﬁt individends andhalf to repurchase shares.
Let Nt equal the number of shares outstanding in year t.
Dividends per share in t are, therefore, $500/Nt, with a
growth rate given by
(8) gt =( dt/dt−1) − 1
=[(500/Nt)/(500/Nt−1)] − 1
=( Nt−1/Nt) − 1.
In words, the rate of growth of dividends per share is equal
to the rate of decline in the number of shares outstanding.
Let ps,t be the share price in year t. Because shareholders
stand to get the whole proﬁt stream regardless of the cor-
porate dividend policy, it should be true that
(9) Ntps,t = $1,000/0.1.
If $500 is used to repurchase shares at price ps,t, then
(10) ps,t(Nt−1−Nt) = 500.
Combining equations (9) and (10), we get
(11) Nt/Nt−1 = 1/1.05.
Hence, the growth rate for dividends is 5 percent per year.
Without share repurchases, we compute a dividend
yield of 0.10 and a dividend growth rate of 0 percent. With
share repurchases, we compute a dividend yield of 0.05
and a dividend growth rate of 5 percent. In both scenarios,
the initial share price is $10 and the stock yield is 10 per-
cent. For the second scenario, we simply treat the share re-
purchases as if they were a one-to-one substitute for divi-
dends. Therefore, we should get the same equity premium
whether we use the narrow or the broad measure of divi-
dends.
We display in Chart 6 both of these measures of div-
idend yields, calculated for the BOG stock portfolio.
8 The
narrow series is the portfolio’s total dividends each year
divided by the stock market’s total value in the preceding
year (as shown in Chart 2). The broad series is total div-
idends less net new equity issues for both domestic non-ﬁnancial corporations and ﬁnancial corporations, all di-
vided by the stock market value in the preceding year. Net
new equity issues are equal to new share issues less share
repurchases. Chart 6 shows that the net new equity issues
can add signiﬁcantly to the volatility of payouts.
However, the levels of the narrow and broad measures
of dividend yields both average 4.4 percent over the post–
World War II period. The main difference between the two
series is that broad dividend yields are more volatile. That
makes it harder to form expectations for the broad yield
and for future dividend growth rates. We thus are better off
using the narrow measure of dividends in our estimate of
the equity premium.
Is Our Bond Yield Too High?
All that we have left to tinker with is estimates of bond
yields. The equity premium has decreased in the 1990s
primarily because bond returns and yields have been dra-
matically higher than average during those years. (See
Chart 3.) In our calculations for the equity premium in
1999, we used a nominal bond yield of 6.82 percent,
which is the yield of a 20-year U.S. Treasury bond. Is this
yield too high?
It is certainly higher than the yield on bonds with
shorter maturities. Over the period 1926–99, the average
yield on 20-year Treasury bonds was 0.5 of a percentage
point higher than the average yield on 5-year Treasury
bonds. (See Chart 3.) In 1999, the 5-year bond yield was
6.5 percent, 0.3 of a percentage point below the 20-year
yield. However, using this adjusted 1999 value in our for-
mula doesn’t change the premium estimates much. The




9 is 0.1 of a percentage point for
the publicly traded (S&P and CRSP) stock portfolios and
3 percentage points for the total (BOG) stock portfo-
lio—more or less the values we got with the longer-term
bonds.
A more reasonable argument for a higher premium is
based on transaction costs due to the illiquidity that in-
vestors face with government securities. Costs incurred in
shifting out of such securities can be as much as 0.5 of a
percentage point. If we subtract that much from our bond
yield estimate of about 6.8 percent, then our equity pre-
mium formula gives an estimate of 0.3 of a percentage
point for the publicly traded portfolios and 3.2 percentage
points for the total stock portfolio. Yet, again, these es-
timates are fairly close to our original estimates.
The Bottom Line
Thus, our exercises with alternative assumptions have not
shaken our result. Adding net share repurchases to our cal-
culations does not affect our equity premium estimates.
Allowing for higher dividend growth does—but extraordi-
nary growth in dividends is needed to get estimates close
to the historical averages. Lowering bond yields also in-
creases our estimates a bit, but bond yields have increased
dramatically over our sample period. Taking account of
large transaction costs due to illiquidity increases our es-
timates only mildly.
Our bottom line is that the U.S. equity premium has
declined signiﬁcantly during 1970–99. We see this even
when we use the higher stock yields for total stock hold-
ings of U.S. residents (the BOG stock portfolio); reason-
able assumptions lead to a premium of about 3 percentage
points. For the stock portfolios that most people analyze—
S&P stocks and CRSP stocks—the premium is between 0
and 2 percentage points. To get a value around 2, though,
we need to assume much faster dividend growth in the
near term than is observed historically as well as large
transaction costs for bonds.
Reasonableness
We have used the stock valuation model in equation (3) to
calculate the equity premium at different points in time.
The sizes of premium we computed should correspond to
what investors expect to get only if their expectations
about the future dividend growth rate match ours. While
some may think that this is not likely, we argue that it is.
At face value, some of our estimates might not seem
reasonable. For several years in our sample, our calculated
equity premium is quite close to zero. For example, the
premium calculated with S&P stocks is −0.26 of a per-
centage point at the end of 1982 and −0.27 of a percent-
age point at the end of 1999. If these estimates are indeed
correct, then between 1982 and 1999, investors must have
earned the same rate of return from stocks and bonds,
aside from the differences between the actual dividends
they received and what they expected to get from stocks.
That is, $100 invested in either stocks or bonds at the end
of 1982 would have about the same value at the end of
1999. Yet a look at the data seems to show something
else. During 1982–99, S&P stocks earned an annualized
average return of 18.35 percent, while an investment in
30-year government bonds, made at the end of 1982 and
held until the end of 1999, earned an annualized average
return of 11.68 percent—substantially less than the stock
return. Does this mean our equity premium calculations
are faulty?
No; the comparison itself is faulty. It is comparing as-
sets which have different maturities. Stocks have a signiﬁ-
cantly longer life than 30-year government bonds, so these
two types of assets would not necessarily have the same
return over any particular period. A more appropriate asset
to compare to stocks is bonds that have no maturity at all:
consol bonds with coupons that grow at the same rate that
stock dividends are expected to grow.
In our equity premium calculations, we assumed that
S&P stock dividends grew at a constant rate of 5.19 per-
cent per year (their average annual growth during 1927–
99). Hence, consider a consol bond that pays annual cou-
pons—aﬁrst coupon of $1, paid at the end of the ﬁrst year,
and after that the coupons growing at 5.19 percent per
year, forever. Then, at the end of 1982, with the long-term
bond yield at 10.95 percent, the price of this consol bond
will be $17.36. At the end of 1999, with the long-term
bond yield at 6.82 percent, the bond’s price will be $145.
Thus, an investment of $100 in this consol bond at the end
of 1982, which is sold at the end of 1999, after having paid
all the coupons in between, will earn an annualized aver-
age return of 16.88 percent—a return close to the actual
18.35 percent annualized average return on S&P stocks
over the period.
Why the 1.47 percentage point difference, if our equity
premium estimates are close to zero for the period? By the
end of 1999, the expected S&P dividend growth rate may
have increased somewhat from our assumed 5.19 percent.
That would increase the yield of S&P stocks and so the
equity premium. We saw that, recall, when we changedourassumption ofgrowth individendsfrom their5.19 per-
cent historical average to the 6.72 percent historical av-
erage growth of GNP. That changed assumption increased
our premium estimate to 1.42 percentagepoints—which is
still small, but in the range of the value calculated with the
sample consol bond.
Conﬁrmation
Our bottom line is consistent with those of several other
recent studies that have compared U.S. stock and bond
yields over time.
Perhaps the earliest is the study done by Blanchard
(1993). He compares expected real yields on stocks and
bonds during 1929–93. He computes expected yields as
ﬁtted values of regressions on a list of variables assumed
to be part of investors’information sets when expectations
are made. As we do, Blanchard uses both intermediate-
and long-term bonds. However, the stock portfolio he uses
includes only publicly traded stocks; he does not consider
the total stock portfolio reported by the Fed (BOG stocks).
The results of Blanchard’s (1993) exercise are very
close to ours for the S&P and CRSP portfolios. For ex-
ample,thedifferencebetweentheyieldonS&Pstocksand
the yield on 20-year bonds that we display in Chart 4 is
close to Blanchard’s estimates in his Figure 11. With ad-
ditional data in the 1990s, we ﬁnd that little has changed.
The premium for publicly traded stocks has remained be-
tween 0 and 2 percentage points.
More recently, Wadhwani (1999, Table 15) has com-
pared real stock yields with returns on U.S. Treasury inﬂa-
tion-protected securities (TIPS). Like Blanchard (1993),
Wadhwani only considers stocks that are publicly traded
on the major U.S. stock exchanges. Using data through
1997, Wadhwani estimates a real stock yield of 4.9 per-
cent—2.55percentfortheexpecteddividendyield(adjust-
ed for buybacks) and 2.35 percent for the expected growth
in dividends. He uses a bond yield of 3.2 percent calculat-
ed as the TIPS yield less the cost of illiquidity. Wadhwa-
ni’s premium for 1998 is, therefore, 4.9 less 3.2, or 1.7 per-
centage points.
Using data as of August 1999, Siegel (1999, p. 14) gets
an even smaller premium. He estimates a real S&P stock
yield of 3.3 percent, which is the sum of a 1.2 percent div-
idend yield and a real dividend growth rate of 2.1 percent.
This estimated stock yield falls below the August 1999
yield on TIPS bonds (3.3 vs. 4.0), producing a negative
equitypremium.Thus,Siegellooksforsourcesofdividend
growth that could potentially increase his premium. He
argues that nothing in the data can justify extrapolating the
high historical stock yield forward. He also argues that the
shrinking of the equity premium may be less signiﬁcant
because transaction costs have come down signiﬁcantly.
Fama and French (2001) conclude as well that the eq-
uity premium is shrinking, but their reasoning is based on
a different type of calculation than ours. They compare
stock yields (calculated as in our equation (3)) to average
stock returns (calculated as the sum of the dividend yield
and the growth rate of the stock price), and they ﬁnd a dis-
crepancy over time. These averages line up well for data
between 1872 and 1949. From 1950 through 1999, how-
ever, the average stock yields and returns diverge because
stock prices grew much faster than dividends. Fama and
French show that over the post–World War II period, the
growth in stock prices has been signiﬁcantly higher than
the growth in dividends. Stock returns are thus higher than
the stock yields which are used to forecast returns.
Fama and French (2001) argue that this implies that in
the future both stock returns and the equity premium will
decrease. Consider a simple example that illustrates this
argument. Suppose dividends are growing at a constant
rate of 4 percent per year; the risk-free rate is 4 percent;
and the equity premium starts at 7 percentage points and
shrinks steadily over 50 years to 1 percentage point. When
the equity premium decrease is not expected, a stock’s ini-
tial price is only 44 percent of the price that will prevail
when that decrease is fully expected and taken account of.
By the end of the 50 years, the prices will converge to the
same value regardless of whether the equity premium de-
crease was expected. Hence, investors would earn a higher
rate of return when the decrease is not expected than when
it is (12.1 percent vs. 8.4 percent).
Whatever their approach to the issue, all of these stud-
ies agree that the U.S. equity premium is currently lower
than it has been historically.
9 These estimates seem, how-
ever, to be in sharp contrast to the view of many academ-
ic economists. Welch (2000, p. 514) recently asked 226
professors of ﬁnance to forecast the equity premium over
different horizons. At the one-year horizon, their mean
forecast was 5.8 percentage points, with a standard devia-
tion of 4.5. At the ﬁve-year horizon, their mean forecast
was 6.7 percentage points, with a standard deviation of
2.6. For longer horizons, their mean forecast was roughly
7 percentage points, with a standard deviation of about 2.
Apparently, ﬁnance professors do not expect the equity
premium to shrink.
This view is also stated clearly in standard ﬁnance text-
books. Take, for example, Brealey and Myers (2000, p.
158), who describe how to estimate a return for a diversi-
ﬁed stock market portfolio. They do this by taking the
current interest rate on U.S. Treasury bills plus the average
equity premium over some historical time period. The pre-
mium they use is 9.2 percentage points. In other words,
they simply extrapolate past returns forward.
Brealey and Myers (2000) note that their result is con-
sistentwithsecurityanalysts’forecastsofearningsgrowth.
But if dividends and earnings grow at similar rates, how
can we get such different estimates for the equity premi-
um? The difference in estimates is due to assumptions
about growth rates beyond the analysts’ forecast horizon.
To get a large equity premium, we must assume that
growth rates stay high forever. To get a premium as large
as 9.2 percentage points, we need to assume growth rates
in dividends or earnings to be signiﬁcantly faster than
growth rates in GNP.
To see this, consider our calculation using NIPA div-
idends in equation (7). If we had assumed there that div-
idends grow foreverat 9.9 percent,then our estimate ofthe
equity premium would have been 5.7 percentage points.
Instead, we assumed that dividends grow at 9.9 percent for
5 years and then revert back to the trend growth rate of
GNP. Thus, our estimate of the equity premium is 3.04
percentage points. To get the estimate up to Brealey and
Myers’ 9.2 percentage points, we would need to assume
nominaldividendgrowthof13.2percentperyear—almost
twice as fast as the growth in nominal GNP. This is an
unreasonable assumption.Concluding Remarks
Low predictions for stock returns have important impli-
cations for future investments and for new ﬁnancial the-
ories. It is hard to rationalize a shrinking equity premium
asapermanentshiftinpreferences.Butinstitutionalchang-
es have occurred in the United States that would result in
a permanent shift in stock returns.
One possibility not mentioned earlier is greater oppor-
tunities for portfolio diversiﬁcation. This idea was actually
advanced by Merton (1987) before the 1990s stock price
boom, and more recently, the idea has been pursued by
Heaton and Lucas (2000). Merton shows that the equity
premium can be substantially larger in an economy with
incomplete diversiﬁcation than in one with perfect capital
markets. Heaton and Lucas estimate that the recent in-
creased participation in stock markets can lead to as much
as a 2 percentage point reduction in the equity premium
and can therefore partially explain the high level of stock
prices in the 1990s. This work goes only part way in ac-
counting for the facts, but it seems to be going in the right
direction.
*The authors beneﬁted from discussions with António Baldaque da Silva, Urban
Jermann,NarayanaKocherlakota,andIwanMeier.Theauthorsareparticularlygrateful
to their editor, Kathy Rolfe.
†Also Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota.
1For a discussion of indirect transaction costs, see Treynor 1994.
2If, however, the decline in the equity premium and the consequent rise in equity
prices are due to “irrational exuberance” as advocated by Shiller (2000), then investors
will be even more disappointed. When the exuberance evaporates and the equity pre-
mium increases to a size closer to its historical average, stock prices will fall.
3Note that the equity premium is sometimes deﬁned as the expected return on
equities in excess of the short-term interest rate. This is so in Mehra and Prescott 1985.
4ForabriefoverviewofhistoricalreturnsonU.S.ﬁnancialassets,seetheAppendix.
OurprimarydatasourcesareIbbotsonAssociates2000forStandard&Poor’sstockdata
and U.S. government bond data; the Center for Research on Security Prices (http://gsb
www.uchicago.edu/research/crsp) for CRSP stock data; and FR Board, various dates,
for all stocks held by U.S. residents (BOG stocks).
5See FR Board, various dates, Table L.213. To construct the market value of our
BOG portfolio, we start with the total corporate issues at market value (line 1) and sub-
tract from that the holdings of U.S. issues by foreign residents (line 8). We exclude the
holdings of foreign residents so that we can later match up the stock values with dis-
tributions paid on the stocks, which we do not have for foreigners.
6According to economists at the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, the difference between NIPA dividends and dividends reported by the
CRSP is attributable to differences in coverage. NIPA dividends are benchmarked to
corporate tax data collected by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. The IRS’s corporate
universe in 1997 covered 4.7 million tax returns. In addition to including other public
corporations which are not listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq, this universe in-
cludes privately held corporations. A large subset of the privately held sector is the cat-
egory of S corporations, which grew rapidly during the 1990s. According to the IRS,
in1997,thiscategoryaccountedfor18percentoftotalcashdividenddistributions.Div-
idend distributions from S corporations would not be included in any aggregation of
public corporate data.
ThereisanissueabouthowsomedividenddistributionsfromScorporationsshould
be categorized. If some of this income is not distributions for consumption, then we
wouldwanttorecategorizethatincome.Doingthatwouldimplyalowerdividendyield
(and thus a lower equity premium) than we report for the BOG stock portfolio.
7Again,ifsomedividendincomefromScorporationswereexcludedfromourmea-
sure of dividends, then this estimate of the equity premium would be lower.
8WegetasimilarpatternwhenweusedatafromtheCRSP/COMPUSTATMerged




Historical Returns on U.S. Financial Assets
Inthisappendix,wegiveanoverviewofhistoricalU.S.ﬁnancial
assetreturns.Thesedatahavemotivatedmuchoftherecentasset
pricing literature and serve as a useful background for those un-
familiar with the U.S. experience.
The Series
The accompanying table summarizes the average historical re-
turnsforstocks,long-termU.S.governmentdebt,andshort-term
U.S. government debt. The top panel of data in this table lists
annualized compounded nominal returns for different historical
time periods.*
Returns for the period 1802–1997 are taken from Siegel
1998. For 1871–1997, Siegel computed the stock returns from
capitalization-weighted indexes of all stocks traded on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and, starting in 1962, all stocks
traded on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and in the
Nasdaq Stock Market as well. Capitalization-weighted indexes
use a ﬁrm’s stock price times shares outstanding as weights for
individual ﬁrms. Before 1871, the series are based primarily on
stocks of ﬁnancial institutions, like banks and insurance com-
panies.
Siegel’s returns on debt are returns on U.S. government se-
curities, both short-term bills and long-term bonds, when avail-
able. When these are not available, comparable highly rated se-
curities with low default premiums are used.
After 1926, the data on most stocks and on U.S. Treasury
securities are taken from Ibbotson Associates 2000. The small-
ﬁrm stocks are those of ﬁrms in the smallest quintile of ﬁrms in
terms of their market value of equity, as listed in the New York
Stock Exchange. The S&P stocks are those in the Standard &
Poor’s 500-stock price index. The Treasury bill has a 1-month
maturity; the Treasury bond, a 20-year maturity. The value-
weightedstockreturnsaretakenfromthedatabaseoftheCenter
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). As with Siegel’s stock
returns, these returns are a weighted index of all publicly traded
ﬁrms on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq. The weight for each
ﬁrm in a particular month is its market value (that is, its stock
price times its shares outstanding) as of the previous month di-
vided by the total market’s value.
The Relative Values
Consider compounded annual nominal returns over the past two
centuries. In the period 1802–1997, stocks earned a premium of
4.1percentagepointsoverTreasurybills.Inthe20thcentury,the
premium is even larger. Take, for example, the period 1926–99.
Thedifferenceinaveragereturnsonthevalue-weightedportfolio
overTreasurybillsis7.1percentagepoints—despitethefactthat
during this period the United States experienced both the Great
Depression and World War II. Small-ﬁrm and S&P stocks both
did better during 1926–99 than the value-weighted CRSP port-
folio, earning a premium of 8.8 and 7.5 percentage points, re-
spectively. Even during the period of the Great Depression and
World War II, stocks earned a high return—higher than bills by
between 6.0 and 8.3 percentage points.
In the middle panel of the table, we display standard devia-
tions of the annual nominal returns. Historically, stock returns
are considerably more volatile than Treasury securities—espe-
cially small-ﬁrm stocks. For example, the standard deviation for
small-ﬁrm stocks, which yielded the highest returns in every
subperiod, is 33.6 in 1926–99, whereas the contemporaneous
standard deviations for S&P stocks, Treasury bills, and Treasury
bonds are 20.1, 3.2, and 9.3, respectively. The variability of
Treasury bond returns increased signiﬁcantly after 1970 due toinﬂation uncertainty. Investors demanded a higher return on
these bonds to compensate for the perceived higher risk.
In the bottom panel of the table, we report the real returns,
which are the relevant numbers for investors. (These are the
nominal returns, adjusted for inﬂation, as measured by the con-
sumer price index.) Over the two centuries, the real return on the
value-weighted CRSP portfolio is 7 percent while that on Trea-
sury bills is only 2.9 percent. In the 20th century, the return to
that short-term debt has been even lower—falling below 1 per-
cent after 1926. At the same time, real returns for both small-
ﬁrm and S&P stocks have been around 8 percent.
In the accompanying chart, we show graphically how the
various types of ﬁnancial assets have performed by plotting the
changing value of $1 invested in each type in 1926. The plot is
intended to further illustrate the large differences in returns
across the asset types. We use a logarithmic scale for this chart
because the values of the investments are vastly different.
The relative values are clear in the chart. A $1 investment in
small-ﬁrm stocks in 1926 could have been cashed in for more
than $6,600 in December 1999. A $1 investment in a portfolio
withS&PorCRSPstockswouldhaveturnedintoaround$2,000
or $3,000. While not as good as the small-ﬁrm portfolio, these
stockvaluesdwarfthoseofTreasurysecuritiesofeithermaturity.
A $1 investment in 20-year Treasury bonds in 1926 could have
been cashed in for only about $40 at the end of 1999, and the







For real returns, we subtract the monthly inﬂation rate from rt before doing the cal-
culation.
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Chart 1   Market Value
Ratio of Each Portfolio’s Market Value to U.S. Gross National Product
Chart 2   Dividend Yield
Each Portfolio’s Dividends as a Percentage of Its Market Value*
Standard & Poor’s composite index
Value-weighted index of publicly traded stocks
constructed by the Center for Research in Security Prices
All stocks held by U.S. residents, according to  




Sources: Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices, 
               Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago; FR Board, 
               various dates; U.S. Commerce, various dates
*The BOG dividend yield is constructed from Federal Reserve Board market
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Chart 4   Yields on Stocks and Bonds
Chart 5   Differences Between Yields on Stocks and Bonds
Yield on Each Stock Portfolio* Less Yield on Long-Term Bond




Stock Yields = Each Portfolio’s* Dividend Yield + Average Growth Rate of Its Dividends


















Sources:  Ibbotson Associates 2000; 
               Center for Research in Security Prices,
               Graduate School of Business,
               University of Chicago; FR Board,
               various dates; U.S. Commerce,
               various datesChart 6
Two Measures of the Dividend Yield
Dividend Yields of the BOG Stock Portfolio* (Dividends as a Percentage of Market Value) 


















*The BOG stock portfolio’s dividend yields are constructed from Federal Reserve Board 
  market values and national income and product account dividends.
  Sources: FR Board, various dates; U.S. Commerce, various dates
6Table 1
Growth of U.S. Stock Dividends
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Various Periods, 1927–99
Dividends of Stock Portfolios*
Period S&P CRSP BOG†
Since 1926 1927–99 5.19 5.36 6.93 6.72 3.21
Since WWII 1946–99 6.34 6.20 8.37 7.34 4.18
By Decades 1930–39 –1.00 –1.37 .00 –.30 –1.96
1940–49 6.78 7.86 6.81 11.69 5.64
1950–59 5.15 5.53 5.98 6.69 2.07
1960–69 5.66 5.48 6.79 6.89 2.33
1970–79 5.83 7.09 9.21 10.14 7.09
1980–89 7.11 8.04 10.52 7.83 5.56






*The stock portfolio growth rates are based on dividends per share for the S&P and 
CRSP stocks and on corporate dividends from the national income and product
accounts for the BOG stocks. For definitions of the stock portfolios, see Charts 1–2.
†These data begin in 1930.
Sources:  Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago; FR Board, 
various dates; U.S. Commerce, various datesTable 2
Yields on U.S. Stocks and Bonds
Annual Averages, 1926–99
Stock Yields*
Period S&P CRSP BOG†
Since 1926 1926–99 9.65 9.63 n.a. 5.30
Since WWII 1946–99 9.32 9.34 11.37 6.30
By Decades 1930–39 10.33 10.12 n.a. 2.96
1940–49 11.06 11.10 n.a. 2.24
1950–59 10.51 10.49 12.01 3.11
1960–69 8.47 8.56 10.04 4.78
1970–79 9.33 9.38 11.08 7.57
1980–89 9.80 9.75 12.28 10.39
1990–99 7.83 7.84 10.84 6.85




n.a. = not available
*Dividends for the S&P and CRSP stocks are assumed to grow at their 1927–99 annual 
averages; dividends for the BOG stocks, at the 1930–99 annual average of their series. 
For definitions of the stock portfolios, see Charts 1–2.
†Values of the BOG stocks begin in 1946.
Sources:  Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago; FR Board,  
various dates; U.S. Commerce, various datesTable 3     Average Yield Differences
Over Various Time Periods
Stock Portfolio*
Period S&P CRSP BOG†
Since 1926 1926–99 4.34 4.33 n.a.
Since WWII 1946–99 3.02 3.04 5.07
By Decades 1930–39 7.36 7.16 n.a.
1940–49 8.82 8.86 n.a.
1950–59 7.40 7.38 8.90
1960–69 3.69 3.79 5.26
1970–79 1.76 1.81 3.51
1980–89 –.59 –.65 1.89
1990–99 .98 .99 3.98
December 1999 –.27 –.05 2.71
n.a. = not available
*For definitions of the stock portfolios, see Charts 1–2.
†Values of the BOG stocks begin in 1946.
Sources:  Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices,
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago; FR Board, 
various dates; U.S. Commerce, various datesTable 4
The Recalculated U.S. Equity Premium
Average Yield Differences Between Stocks and Bonds Over Various Time Periods 
With Stock Yields Recalculated as the Sum of Each Portfolio’s* Dividend Yield 
and the Average Growth Rate of U.S. Gross National Product in 1927–99
Stock Portfolio*
Period S&P CRSP BOG†
Since 1926 1926–99 5.88 5.68 n.a.
Since WWII 1946–99 4.55 4.39 4.86
By Decades 1930–39 8.90 8.51 n.a.
1940–49 10.35 10.21 n.a.
1950–59 8.93 8.73 8.69
1960–69 5.23 5.14 5.05
1970–79 3.30 3.16 3.30
1980–89 .94 .71 1.67
1990–99 2.51 2.35 3.77
December 1999 1.26 1.31 2.50
n.a. = not available
*For definitions of the stock portfolios, see Charts 1–2.
†Values of the BOG stocks begin in 1946.
Sources:  Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago; FR Board,  
various dates; U.S. Commerce, various datesU.S. Financial Asset Returns Over the Last Two Centuries
Compounded Annual Average Returns (%) on Various Stock Portfolios
and on U.S. Treasury Securities, 1802–1999
U.S. Treasury 
Stocks Securities
Type  Type of Calculation Value- 20-Year 1-Month
of Return and Period Small-Firm S&P Weighted Bonds Bills
Compounded Average
1802–1997 n.a. n.a. 8.4 4.8 4.3
1926–99 12.6 11.3 10.9 5.1 3.8
1945–99 14.7 13.3 12.9 5.4 4.7
1926–45 9.4 7.1 6.5 4.7 1.1
1945–72 13.7 12.8 12.4 2.2 2.7
1972–99 15.4 14.1 13.6 8.7 6.8
Standard Deviation
1802–1997 n.a. n.a. 17.5 6.1 n.a.
1926–99 33.6 20.1 20.2 9.3 3.2
1945–99 25.7 16.5 16.6 10.4 3.1
1926–45 51.1 28.3 28.3 4.8 1.5
1945–72 28.5 16.6 16.5 6.0 1.8
1972–99 22.6 16.4 16.7 12.5 2.7
Compounded Average
1802–1997 n.a. n.a. 7.0 3.5 2.9
1926–99 9.3 8.0 7.5 1.9 .7
1945–99 10.1 8.8 8.4 1.1 .5
1926–45 9.4 7.1 6.4 4.6 .9
1945–72 10.2 9.3 9.0 –1.0 –.5







n.a. = not available
*Real returns are based on changes in the U.S. consumer price index.
Sources:  Siegel 1998; Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices,
Graduate School of Business, University of ChicagoThe Relative Returns of U.S. Financial Assets in the 20th Century
How the Value of $1 Invested in Each Type of Asset* in 1926
Would Have Changed by the End of 1999





















*For definitions of the stock portfolios, see the accompanying text.
Sources of basic data: Ibbotson Associates 2000; Center for Research in Security Prices,
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago